Huh. I had a conversation with a Tor developer on this topic about a decade ago, when network namespaces were still kind of a new hotness - the feedback I got was that it would be an easy way for people to think they were being secure while still leaking a bunch of identifiable information, so I didn't push that any further.
I think the tor folks made a fundamental strategic error by pushing that line. Yes, people who face a serious threat need to use tor browser and still pay attention to other ways to leak etc. But if we'd got 'tor everywhere' it would still make mass surveillance a lot harder. For one thing, today mass surveillance can detect who is using tor. If everyone was using it that wouldn't matter.
Strange, because torsock and torify do the same thing, but less robustly.
When you have torsocks or torify for everything, you're gonna leave your footprint through tor, whereas something like Tor Browser is designed specifically not to leave any print on the web.
Using tor directly on the kernel level means that your DNS is gonna leak. Your OS telemetry is gonna leak etc.
It's still a good idea but it should be implemented top to bottom and nothing left in between, otherwise you're de-anonymized quickly.